The Optimal Procurement Contract of E-literature in University Library

摘要

This paper analyzes the principal-agent relationship of electronic literature procurement in university library, and establishes a principal-agent model between an university library and an e-literature provider. By means of the derivation and analysis of the equilibrium of the model, we find that the optimal contract of the procurement of eliterature is a basic fixed fee plus a deducting percentage of the services value. In practice, in order to develop a reasonable basic fixed fee, an university library should establish a scientific evaluation index system about procurement costs and working costs of the e-literature providers;in the meantime, let eliterature providers to share some service value of e-literature by the way of commission coefficients, so as to resulte in incentive effect and avoid the problems of "active promotion, negative response" and low utilization of e-literature resulting from a simple fixed annual payment of e-literature.