【24h】

The Split Incentive Barrier: Theory or Practice in the Multifamily Sector?

机译:分裂的激励壁垒:多户家庭的理论或实践?

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例

摘要

Current program evaluation theory posits that the "split incentive barrier" discouragesrnmultifamily property managers/owners from improving the energy efficiency of their tenantrnunits. The premise of this barrier is that although property managers/owners are responsible forrnfacility improvements, they usually do not pay energy bills for the tenant spaces and thereforernhave no direct financial incentive to install more expensive energy-efficient measures.rnHowever, a 2009 evaluation of the Southern California Edison Multifamily EnergyrnEfficiency Rebate Program and a 2007 evaluation of the California statewide Multifamily RebaternProgram found that very few multifamily property managers/owners identified this splitrnincentive barrier as an impediment to energy-efficient improvements in their tenant units. Thesernevaluations posed questions about multifamily barriers to energy efficiency to participating andrnnon-participating multifamily property managers/owners, property managers/owners whoserntenants pay their own energy bills, and installation contractors. The scarcity of evidence for splitincentivernbarriers from all these different multifamily market perspectives led evaluators tornquestion the conventional wisdom that the split incentive was an important barrier for this sector.rnThe fact that only a small percentage of program participants chose to have energy-efficientrnmeasures installed in their common areas only also raised doubts about the split incentive barrier.rnThe 2009 study also asked these property managers/owners why they installed energyefficientrnequipment in their tenant units even though their tenants pay their own energy bills.rnTheir most common response, by far, was that they thought that if their tenants could savernmoney on energy costs, they would have more money left over for rent. Other reasons includedrnimproving tenant satisfaction and increasing property values by replacing old lighting fixtures.rnThese findings suggest that past theorists have misapplied the split incentive barrier in thernmultifamily context. By making energy-efficient improvements in their tenant units, propertyrnmanagers are acting in their own economic self interest.
机译:当前的项目评估理论认为,“分立的激励障碍”会阻止多户型物业管理者/所有者提高其租户单位的能源效率。这种障碍的前提是,尽管物业经理/业主负责改善设施,但他们通常不为租户空间支付能源账单,因此没有直接的经济诱因来安装更昂贵的节能措施。然而,2009年对房屋使用权的评估南加州爱迪生多户家庭节能计划和2007年对加利福尼亚州全州多户家庭折扣计划的评估发现,很少有多户家庭物业经理/所有者认为这种分裂激励障碍是其租户单位提高能效的障碍。这些评估提出了以下问题:参与参与和不参与参与的多户物业管理者/所有者,房客自己支付能源账单的物业管理者/所有者以及安装承包商的多户能源效率壁垒。从所有这些不同的多家庭市场角度来看,分裂激励障碍的证据稀缺,导致评估者质疑传统的观念,即分裂激励是该行业的重要障碍。事实是,只有一小部分计划参与者选择在其参与者中安装节能措施。公共区域也仅引起了人们对激励壁垒的怀疑.2​​009年的研究还询问了这些物业经理/业主,即使他们的租户自己支付能源账单,他们为何在租户单元中安装节能设备.rn到目前为止,他们最普遍的回答是他们认为,如果租户可以节省能源成本的钱,他们将剩下更多的钱用于租金。其他原因包括通过更换旧的照明设备来提高房客满意度和增加财产价值。这些发现表明,过去的理论家在多户家庭背景下错误地使用了分割激励障碍。通过改善房客单位的能源效率,物业管理人员正在为自己的经济利益服务。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号