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Identification of equivalent current source of cryptographic circuit based on impedance and current measurements at board level

机译:基于电路板级的阻抗和电流测量,识别密码电路的等效电流源

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Side-channel attacks are a kind of cryptanalytic attacks by means of the electric current in the range of radio frequency (RF) leaking out from a cryptographic integrated circuit (IC) and/or the electromagnetic radiation generated by the RF power current. The RF power current is caused by simultaneous switching activities of logic gates during an encryption process operated in the cryptographic IC. The RF power current is a major cause of the electromagnetic interference (EMI). To decrease the RF power current at PCB level can lead to decrease designing costs. As a preparation of applying LECCS models to a cryptographic IC for estimating the RF power current occurred during an encryption process, the model parameters were identified from measurements in this paper. The LECCS models were composed of a current source that expressed the RF power current occurred in the cryptographic circuit and a passive network. The current source identified grown in amplitude 200 ns after the beginning of the encryption process. This agreed to the beginning of the target round. In frequency domain, current spectra were seen at 24 MHz and its harmonics. The authors obtained waveforms of the RF power current from analog circuit simulations with the LECCS model identified, and validated the cryptographic device in security against the side-channel attacks by means of the correlation power analysis (CPA) method. Results of CPA with the simulated waveforms were consistent to CPA results with measured waveforms. These results means that model parameters were identified correctly, and suggests that the LECCS model is effective for validation of cryptographic devices with respect to side-channel attacks.
机译:旁信道攻击是一种加密分析攻击,它通过从密码集成电路(IC)泄漏的射频(RF)范围内的电流和/或由RF功率电流产生的电磁辐射来进行。 RF电流是由在加密IC中进行的加密过程中逻辑门的同时切换活动引起的。射频功率电流是电磁干扰(EMI)的主要原因。降低PCB级的RF功率电流可以降低设计成本。为将LECCS模型应用于加密IC以估计在加密过程中发生的RF功率电流的准备工作,本文通过测量确定了模型参数。 LECCS模型由一个电流源组成,该电流源表示发生在加密电路和无源网络中的RF功率电流。在加密过程开始后,识别出的电流源以200 ns的幅度增长。这同意了目标回合的开始。在频域中,可以看到在24 MHz及其谐波处的电流频谱。作者从已识别出LECCS模型的模拟电路仿真中获得了RF功率电流的波形,并通过相关功率分析(CPA)方法验证了该加密设备在抵抗侧信道攻击方面的安全性。模拟波形的CPA结果与测量波形的CPA结果一致。这些结果意味着可以正确识别模型参数,并且表明LECCS模型对于验证针对侧通道攻击的加密设备非常有效。

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