首页> 外文会议>Society of Instrument and Control Engineers Annual Conference >Identification of Equivalent Current Source of Cryptographic Circuit Based on Impedance and Current Measurements at Board Level
【24h】

Identification of Equivalent Current Source of Cryptographic Circuit Based on Impedance and Current Measurements at Board Level

机译:基于阻抗和电流测量在板级的基础上识别加密电路等效电流源

获取原文

摘要

Side-channel attacks are a kind of cryptanalytic attacks by means of the electric current in the range of radio frequency (RF) leaking out from a cryptographic integrated circuit (IC) and/or the electromagnetic radiation generated by the RF power current. The RF power current is caused by simultaneous switching activities of logic gates during an encryption process operated in the cryptographic IC. The RF power current is a major cause of the electromagnetic interference (EMI). To decrease the RF power current at PCB level can lead to decrease designing costs. As a preparation of applying LECCS models to a cryptographic IC for estimating the RF power current occurred during an encryption process, the model parameters were identified from measurements in this paper. The LECCS models were composed of a current source that expressed the RF power current occurred in the cryptographic circuit and a passive network. The current source identified grown in amplitude 200 ns after the beginning of the encryption process. This agreed to the beginning of the target round. In frequency domain, current spectra were seen at 24 MHz and its harmonics. The authors obtained waveforms of the RF power current from analog circuit simulations with the LECCS model identified, and validated the cryptographic device in security against the side-channel attacks by means of the correlation power analysis (CPA) method. Results of CPA with the simulated waveforms were consistent to CPA results with measured waveforms. These results means that model parameters were identified correctly, and suggests that the LECCS model is effective for validation of cryptographic devices with respect to side-channel attacks.
机译:侧通道攻击是一种通过从加密集成电路(IC)泄漏的射频(RF)范围内的电流的密码攻击和/或由RF功率电流产生的电磁辐射。 RF功率电流是由在加密过程中操作期间逻辑门的同时切换活动引起的。 RF功率电流是电磁干扰(EMI)的主要原因。为了减少PCB电平的RF功率电流可导致降低设计成本。作为将LECCS模型应用于加密过程中发生的RF功率电流的加密IC的准备,从本文的测量中识别了模型参数。 LECCS模型由电流源组成,该电流源表示在加密电路和被动网络中发生的RF功率电流。在加密过程开始后,在幅度200 ns中识别的电流源。这同意目标回合的开始。在频域中,在24 MHz及其谐波中看到当前光谱。作者通过识别的LECCS模型获得了来自模拟电路模拟的RF功率电流的波形,并通过相关功率分析(CPA)方法通过侧通道攻击验证了对安全性的加密设备。具有模拟波形的CPA的结果与测量波形的CPA结果一致。这些结果意味着正确识别了模型参数,并表明LECCS模型对于侧信机攻击的验证是有效的加密设备。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号