A Strategy for Verifying Non-deployment of Nuclear Delivery Systems

摘要

This paper presents a strategy for verifying the non-deployment of certain types ofrnnuclear delivery systems. One option for restraint is restricting the operationalrndeployment locations of missile forces. Verifying that this restraint measure is beingrnimplemented requires a balance of opacity and transparency in implementation. Fullrntransparency in missile deployment actually reduces deterrence stability because eachrnside receives potential targeting information that might be exploited. This paper outlinesrna statistically-based approach to verification that requires only limited transparency inrnmissile deployment. If the missiles are effectively tagged and inspected, the analysisrndemonstrates that only a sub-set of the missile population has to be polled to concludernwith high confidence that the declared missiles remain in the agreed zones. Thernappropriate use of opacity preserves deterrence stability.