REMOTE MONITORING OF SENSITIVE NUCLEAR MATERIALS

摘要

Remote and/or unattended monitoring of safeguarded nuclear materials is a reasonably wellunderstoodrnproblem, and a number of well-developed measurement and data transmissionrntechnologies are available in this field. The advantages of remote monitoring—in terms of cost,rntime, and access requirements—have been widely documented. Even so, there are still some majorrnchallenges posed by remote/unattended monitoring, including (1) the culling of interesting eventsrnfrom very large data sets and (2) the authentication (by the inspector) of transmitted measurementrndata. In addition to these, remote/unattended monitoring of sensitive material brings another seriesrnof challenges. For example, the host country may have concerns about information that could bernreleased about the material itself. Not only could the material’s characteristics be sensitive, but itsrnlocation and movements could be as well. Although these issues are closely related to issuesrnassociated with measuring sensitive materials in an attended mode, they add another set ofrninspector needs and host requirements to the scenario. If a conceptual remote monitoring systemrnfor sensitive materials is created, three overlapping areas of concern can be seen. The first concern,rnprimarily from the host’s point of view, is that sensitive information must be protected withoutrninterfering in the efficient operation of the facility being monitored. The second concern, ofrnparticular interest to the inspector, is that it must be possible to authenticate the data, both duringrnmonitoring or measurement and after transmission. Finally, the third concern is that the verificationrnsystem must be reliable and robust, which is a concern of both parties.