A Power Analysis Attack Countermeasure Based on Random Execution

摘要

Side-channel Attack, such as simple power analysis and differential power analysis (DPA), is an efficient method to gather the key, which challenges the security of crypto chips. Side-channel Attack logs the power trace of the crypto chip and speculate the key by statistical analysis. To reduce the threat of power analysis attack, an innovative method based on random execution is proposed in this paper. In order to enhance ability against DPA, the method disorders the correspondence between power trace and operands by scrambling the data execution sequence randomly and dynamically. Experiments and verification are done on the Sakura-G FPGA platform. The results show that the key is not reveal after even 1 million power traces by adopting proposed method and only 1.12% slices overhead is introduced. Compared to unprotected chip, it increases more than 140× measure to disclosure.