Cryptanalysis of SKINNY in the Framework of the SKINNY 2018-2019 Cryptanalysis Competition

摘要

In April 2018, Beierle et al. launched the 3rd SKINNY cryptanalysis competition, a contest that aimed at motivating the analysis of their recent tweakable block cipher SKINNY. In contrary to the previous editions, the focus was made on practical attacks: contestants were asked to recover a 128-bit secret key from a given set of 2~(20) plaintext blocks. The suggested SKINNY instances are 4- to 20-round reduced variants of SKINNY-64-128 and SKINNY-128-128. In this paper, we explain how to solve the challenges for 10-round SKINNY-128-128 and for 12-round SKINNY-64-128 in time equivalent to roughly 2~(52) simple operations. Both techniques benefit from the highly biased sets of messages that are provided and that actually correspond to the encryption of various books in ECB mode.