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The Civilization Dilemma : The Effect of Communication and Backward Induction in Social Dilemmas

机译:文明困境:沟通与后向归纳在社会困境中的影响

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This essay will create a model to simulate the dilemma that two civilizations will face if they meet in the universe based on the Prisoner's Dilemma model. The creation of this model is based on six main assumptions. The model first concludes that the civilizations are likely to attack each other and end up with a lose-lose circumstance. However, by relieving more and more assumptions, the importance of communication and backward induction start to stand out. By further analyzing and separate the model into two sections, it further concludes that civilizations are likely to develop together peacefully due to the two-way threat and communication. Then, a new model called “Liar Model” which is similar to a Stag Hunt Game has been created based on the second model. This model concludes that civilizations are likely to reach a new situation of distrustful cooperation.
机译:本文将创建一个模型来模拟两个文明的困境,如果他们根据囚犯的困境模型在宇宙中遇到。 该模型的创建基于六个主要假设。 该模型首先结束了,文明可能会互相攻击并最终遭受丢失的情况。 然而,通过缓解越来越多的假设,通信和后退归纳的重要性开始脱颖而出。 通过进一步分析并将模型分成两个部分,其进一步得出结论,由于双向威胁和沟通,文明可能会和平地发展。 然后,已经基于第二种模型创建了一种称为“骗子模型”的新模型,该模型类似于STAG Hunt游戏。 该模型的结论是,文明可能达到信任合作的新形势。

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