Taming Time-Varying Information Asymmetry in Fresh Status Acquisition

摘要

Many online platforms are providing valuable real-time contents (e.g., traffic) by continuously acquiring the status of different Points of Interest (PoIs). In status acquisition, it is challenging to determine how frequently a PoI should upload its status to a platform, since they are self-interested with private and possibly time-varying preferences. This paper considers a general multi-period status acquisition system, aiming to maximize the aggregate social welfare and ensure the platform freshness. The freshness is measured by a metric termed age of information. For this goal, we devise a long-term decomposition (LtD) mechanism to resolve the time-varying information asymmetry. The key idea is to construct a virtual social welfare that only depends on the current private information, and then decompose the per-period operation into multiple distributed bidding problems for the PoIs and platforms. The LtD mechanism enables the platforms to achieve a tunable trade-off between payoff maximization and freshness conditions. Moreover, the LtD mechanism retains the same social performance compared to the benchmark with symmetric information and asymptotically ensures the platform freshness conditions. Numerical results based on real-world data show that when the platforms pay more attention to payoff maximization, each PoI still obtains a non-negative payoff in the long-term.