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Coordination of a Three-echelon Pharma-Supply Chain with Corporate Social Responsibility Under Spanning and Pair-wise Revenue Sharing Contracts

机译:协调三个梯队的制药链,在跨越和配对收入共享合同下的企业社会责任

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Expanding social dimensions of different businesses in the last decade's results in reviewing global issues in particular Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). In this view, the achievement of desired responsibility levels is intertwined with classical decisions such as ordering and pricing. In addition, decision making processes in supply chains provides a range of theories and implications about conducting coordination mechanisms through the chain interactions. In this paper, a manufacturer, distributor and retailer are considered to form a three-echelon pharmaceutical supply chain. It is possible for the manufacturer to invest in responsibility level which improves market demand. Moreover, the demand depends on different prices which the retailer sets for end customers. Thus, the effect of pricing and responsibility levels on the profitability and coordination of the chain is analyses under different revenue sharing contracts. The coordination analysis shows that spanning revenue sharing can coordinate the chain partners in the absence of goodwill penalty costs where the holding costs should be assigned merely to one of the downstream partners. On the other hand the pair-wise revenue sharing cannot provide coordination condition and its level of efficiency is dependent on the Stackelberg gaming of the downstream partners.
机译:在过去十年中扩大不同业务的社会方面,结果审查了特别是企业社会责任(CSR)的全球问题。在这种观点中,实现所需的责任水平与诸如订购和定价之类的经典决策交织在一起。此外,供应链中的决策过程提供了一系列关于通过链相互作用进行协调机制的理论和意义。在本文中,制造商,分销商和零售商被认为是一种三梯度药物供应链。制造商可以投资责任水平,从而提高市场需求。此外,需求取决于零售商为最终客户集中的不同价格。因此,在不同的收入共享合同下分析了定价和责任水平对链条盈利能力和协调的影响。协调分析表明,跨越收入共享可以在没有善意惩罚成本的情况下协调连锁合作伙伴,其中应该仅仅将持有费用分配给下游合作伙伴之一。另一方面,成对的收入共享不能提供协调条件,其效率水平取决于下游合作伙伴的Stackelberg游戏。

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