The dynamic game analysis of project manager's following investment incentive mechanism of the venture capital firms

摘要

In the venture capital firms, the relationship between the project manager and shareholders is the agency relationship. Because of the existence of internal control phenomenon and opportunistic behavior, we must inspire and constraint the project manager. To compensate for the drawbacks of the traditional salary incentive mechanism, in recent years, some venture capital companies require the manager to invest the project with their own funds. However, the scholars have no further study and research on this mechanism. For this reason, I established a dynamic game model basing on the related theories research and the interviews to the main venture capital firms to analyze the dynamic game of project manager's investment along with the investment mechanism of the venture capital firms. By the research conclusions, I conclude that the returning expection value deducting the time value present different relation among different following investment stock proportion, venture capital firm and project manager in different conditions. Meanwhile, when following investment stock ratio meets the fixed interval, adopting this mechanism can help to improve venture capital firm and project manager's the returning expection value deducting the time value and stimulate both sides, forming a sub-game perfect Nash Equilibrium.