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Psychiatry and the poverty of subjectivity: How phenomenology can contribute to the validation of categories of disorder

机译:精神病学和主观性的贫困:现象学如何促进无序类别的验证

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Psychiatry, and especially psychiatric classification, finds itself in a state of crisis. Recent criticisms have been leveled by patient advocacy groups, psychotherapists, and even psychiatrists (including the chairs of both the DSM-III and DSM-IV taskforces). Most notably, the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) announced - just weeks prior to the 2013 publication of the DSM-5 - that it will primarily fund studies that do not use the DSM-5 categories of disorder. In light of the problems of classification plaguing the field of psychiatry, a number of phenomenologists (including Aho, Parnas, Ratcliffe, Sass, Stanghellini, and Zahavi) have argued that contemporary phenomenological research into psychopathology should be used to guide the project of reclassification. While I agree with this claim, I argue that these phenomenologists have failed to delineate among a number of domains of phenomenological research. And, in failing to make such distinctions, are unable to distinguish between those areas of research that can be used to validate categories of disorder, and those that cannot. In order to remedy this issue in contemporary phenomenological psychopathology, I here propose three domains of phenomenological research - 1) existential structures, 2) modes, and 3) traditions. The first is understood as the domain of phenomenology proper, and consists of the categorial characteristics of human existence (e.g. intersubjectivity, embodiment, situatedness, etc.). The second is understood as the study of the various modes of these categorial characteristics (the modes of Situatedness, for example, include anxiety, boredom, joy, etc.). The third is understood as the domain of hermeneutics proper, but is often included in phenomenological studies. It consists of the framework of meaning that sediments throughout cultural and biographical developments, shaping what we see things as (e.g. people from different religious backgrounds will experience different objects as sacred, without actively interpreting the meaning of these objects).
机译:精神病学,特别是精神分类,发现自己处于危机状态。最近的批评已经受到患者倡导群体,心理治疗师和精神科医生(包括DSM-III和DSM-IV CARTFORCES的椅子)的调整。最值得注意的是,国家心理健康研究所(NIMH)宣布 - 仅在2013年发布的DSM-5发布前几周 - 主要是资金研究,不使用DSM-5类别无序。鉴于精神病学领域的分类问题,许多现象学家(包括Aho,Parnas,Ratcliffe,Sass,Stanghellini和Zahavi)认为,当代现代的现象学研究应使用对精神病理学的研究来指导重新分类的项目。虽然我同意这一索赔,但我认为这些现象学者未能在一些现象学研究中描绘。并且,在未能提出这种区分的情况下,无法区分这些研究领域,可以用于验证无序类别的类别,以及那些不能的人。为了在当代现象学精神病理学中纠正这个问题,我在这里提出了三个现象学研究领域 - 1)存在的结构,2)模式和3)传统。首先被理解为适当的现象学的领域,并且由人类存在的分类特征(例如,运动性,实施例,位度等)组成。第二据理解为对这些分类特征的各种模式的研究(例如,定位的模式,例如,包括焦虑,无聊,快乐等)。第三个被理解为诠释学的领域适当,但通常包括在现象学研究中。它包括沉积物整个文化和传记发育的框架,塑造了我们看到的东西(例如,来自不同宗教背景的人将经历不同的物体,因为神圣,而不是积极地解释这些物体的含义)。

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