We investigate profitability from secondary spectrum provision under unknown relationships between price charged for spectrum use and demand drawn at the given price. We show that profitability is governed by the applied admission policy and the price charged to secondary users. We explicitly identify a critical price (market entry price) such that if secondary demand is charged below that price, the licensee endures losses from spectrum provision, regardless of the applied admission policy. Furthermore, we show that an admission policy that admits secondary demand only when no channel is occupied is profitable for any price that exceeds the critical price. We prove that this policy is profit-robust to variations in secondary demand, i.e., if the policy is profitable for a certain price, it will be profitable for any secondary demand that the price generates, as long as the price generates demand. We also investigate profitability from a set of policies that allow more secondary users to access spectrum by defining the number of users that can be concurrently served. Our results demonstrate profit-robustness of these policies and explicitly characterize profitable prices. We provide a numerical study to verify our theoretical findings.
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