This paper considers a two-level and a dual-channel supply chain, where a manufacturer sells products through both her own online channel and a traditional retail channel. Both them provide customers with some pre-sales services by brick store and online consulting, which have positive impact on the market demand and lead to bi-direction free-riding.in order to improving supply chain performance, we investigate the coordination of the retailer channel and online channel by revenue-sharing contract. Our study presents the following findings. (i) Under the non-differential pricing scenario, retailer do not exist the optimal free-riding level, however the manufacturer have always the optimal free-riding level. The results are just reversed our intuition. (ii) Under each of the two pricing scenarios, the revenue-sharing contract can effectively stimulate the retailer to improve his service level while free riding occurred. (iii) Even if under the revenue-sharing contract, free riding has always a negative effect on the retailer's profit.
展开▼
