From just using animals to a justification of animal use: the intrinsic value of animals as a confusing start

摘要

Recently the Council for Animal Affairs issued a report, entitled the 'Agenda for Future Animal Policy'. One of the topics in this report is the emphasis on the need for the government to come to a more explicit and transparent justification for animal use. It is claimed that arguments that refer to tradition or existing practices of animal use are, or at least will be no longer a sufficient justification for the use of animals for a number of goals including, company, sports, science, and food. Thisneed was recognized by the government and resulted in a project of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture, and Innovation on the ethical justification of keeping animal (2011). One of the elements of this project was a series of focus group discussions with stakeholders on the moral values that underlie their practices of keeping animals. A second part of this project is an analysis of the problem of moral justification of keeping animal. This paper is the result of and presents some parts of this project. I start with a discussion of the question of why justification is needed. At this point the answer can both start from respect for public opinions and from specific views on the moral status of animals. In the latter case there are regular references to the intrinsic value of the animal. A notion that is even included in the law. The problem is that this concept is not used in a clear and univocal way. This is problematic, because a reference to intrinsic value may include different points of view on the moral position of animals and the acceptability of keeping animals. In this short paper, I try to distinguish three different views on the moral value of animals and the related view on the justification on animal use. And I propose to reserve only one interpretation to the reference of intrinsic value, i.e. the view that animals, based on some (higher) cognitive capacities, are worth of due respect as individuals and thus should be considered as end in themselves and not merely as means to human goals. This does not disqualify the other views. On the contrary, by using a more strict definition of the intrinsic value view, I think it is possible to understand and value the other moral position better.