Resilient Cyber-Secure Systems and System of Systems: Implications for the Department of Defense

摘要

Over the past two decades, the United States has continued to modify and improve upon its cyber strategy as a result of a constantly evolving and asymmetric cyber threat. As the dependency on networked systems and connectiv-ity has increased, so have the complexity and vulnerability of these systems within US critical infrastructure. For this reason, resilience, affordability, and collabora-tion between the government and private industry will be imperative in maintaining the cyberspace advantage as cyber threats groups continue to target systems and system-of-systems (SoS) within the Department of Defense (DoD) (Syst Eng 15:95-107; Wheaton MJ (2016) Affordable resilient systems. Engineered resilient systems and system-of-systems. University of Southern California, Olin Hall, Los Angeles, 4 Apr 2016, Lecture). Systems engineering concepts such as trade-space analysis and systems thinking, in concert with an emphasis on resilience at critical system nodes and boundaries, can help reduce system vulnerability when confronted by a constantly adapting cyber landscape. Given the perpetual and rapid evolution of cyber threats due to technological advances and network reli-ance, designing critical infrastructure systems for survivability is no longer suffi-cient. This paper identifies current limitations in the nation's cyber strategy and recommends approaches to fill those gaps.