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Game-Theoretic Models for Usage-based Maintenance Contract

机译:基于用法的维护合同的游戏理论模型

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A usage-based maintenance contracts with coordination and non coordination between two parties is studied in this paper. The contract is applied to a dump truck operated in a mining industry. The situation under study is that an agent offers service contract to the owner of the truck after warranty ends. This contract has only a time limit but no usage limit. If the total usage per period exceeds the maximum usage allowed in the contract, then the owner will be charged an additional cost. In general, the agent (Original Equipment Manufacturer/OEM) provides a full coverage of maintenance, which includes PM and CM under the lease contract. The decision problem for the owner is to select the best option offered that fits to its requirement, and the decision problem for the agent is to find the optimal maintenance efforts for a given price of the service option offered. We first find the optimal decisions using coordination scheme and then with non coordination scheme for both parties.
机译:本文研究了基于使用的维护合同,并在两方之间进行协调和非协调。合同适用于在矿业行业运营的自卸车上。正在研究的情况是,经过保修结束后,代理人为卡车所有者提供服务合同。本合同只有一个时间限制,但没有使用限制。如果每期使用总使用率超过合同中允许的最大使用情况,则所有者将收取额外费用。通常,代理商(原始设备制造商/ OEM)提供了全面的维护覆盖,包括在租赁合同下的PM和CM。业主的决策问题是选择所提供的最佳选择,该选项适合其要求,而代理的决策问题是为提供所提供的服务选项的特定价格找到最佳维护工作。我们首先使用协调方案找到最佳决策,然后找到双方的非协调方案。

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