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Two-echelon logistics service supply chain decision game considering quality supervision

机译:两梯度物流服务供应链决策博弈考虑质量监督

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Due to the increasing importance of supply chain logistics service, we established the Stackelberg game model between single integrator and single subcontractors under decentralized and centralized circumstances, and found that logistics services integrators as a leader prefer centralized decision-making but logistics service subcontractors tend to the decentralized decision-making. Then, we further analyzed why subcontractor chose to deceive and rebuilt a principal-agent game model to monitor the logistics services quality of them. Mixed Strategy Nash equilibrium and related parameters were discussed. The results show that strengthening the supervision and coordination can improve the quality level of logistics service supply chain.
机译:由于供应链物流服务的重要性越来越重要,我们在分散和集中的情况下在单一积分器和单个分包商之间建立了Stackelberg游戏模型,并发现物流服务集成商作为领导者更喜欢集中决策,但物流服务分包商倾向于分散决策。然后,我们进一步分析了为什么分包商选择欺骗和重建委托代理游戏模型,以监测它们的物流服务质量。讨论了混合策略纳什均衡和相关参数。结果表明,加强监督和协调可以提高物流服务供应链的质量水平。

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