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What Corruption and Rent Seeking in Mining Communities Suggest About the Curse of Natural Resources

机译:在矿业社区寻求造成的腐败和租金对自然资源的诅咒

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Peter Ekeh's theory of corruption views it as an expression of loyalty to what he calls 'primordial' groups at the expense of more formal civic institutions. This paper explores what might be learned about discouraging rent seeking and corruption around mines by combining the primordial versus civic distinction with the social capital based concept of 'the radius of trust'.Macroeconomic studies have identified corruption and rent-seeking as key factors in generating the curse of natural resources. 'The curse' consists of a tendency for economies rich in natural resources, such as precious metals and oil, to grow more slowly than those without such endowments. Recommendations for avoiding the curse have been directed at national governments and extractive companies but very little advice is available for local mine managers. To examine how Ekeh's theory and social capital based concepts might help provide such recommendations, this paper reports on specific actions taken by site level management of a gold mine in Papua New Guinea to combat corruption and rent seeking by a few stakeholders. The case featured a clear set of primordial groups (i.e., traditional clans) and a set of civic institutions (i.e., administrative institutions continued from the colonial era). The findings are compatible with a more general interpretation of Ekeh's theory and corroborate anthropological findings of changes in group boundaries when traditional communities start receiving compensation or royalties for resource extraction.In terms of relevance for mine managers, it was found that institution-oriented strategies (e.g., legal defenses, education in trust fund protection, and the exclusion of selected local authorities from fund distribution chains) produced only temporary reduction in corruption, bribery, and rent-seeking. A more promising approach might be to treat corruption and rent seeking as a type of collective action problem. Such problems are frequently resolved with multi-party initiatives that expand the radius of trust.
机译:彼得Ekeh的腐败其视为忠诚的他所谓的“原始”群体在较为正式的民间机构为代价表达的理论。本文探讨了可能被了解由原始与公民的区分与“trust'.Macroeconomic研究的半径社会资本概念为基础相结合劝阻寻租和腐败各地矿山已经确定了腐败和寻租作为发电的关键因素自然资源的诅咒。 “诅咒”由对经济拥有丰富的天然资源,如贵金属和石油的倾向,比那些没有这样的天赋更缓慢地生长。为了避免诅咒的建议都针对国家政府和采掘公司,但很少给建议是供当地矿长。要研究如何Ekeh的理论和社会资本的基础概念可能有助于提供这样的建议,由一个金矿在巴布亚新几内亚打击腐败的现场管理水平,并采取租由几个利益相关者寻求在具体行动提出报告。案例精选一套明确的原始群体(即传统部族)和一组民间机构(即行政事业单位从殖民时代延续)的。这些发现与Ekeh理论的更普遍的解释兼容,并证实在组边界变化的人类学调查结果时,传统的社区开始接受赔偿或特许权的矿长相关的资源extraction.In而言,人们发现,面向机构的策略(例如,法律抗辩,教育信托基金的保护,并入选地方当局从基金分配链中的除外)只产生在贪污,贿赂暂时降低,和寻租。更有前途的方法可能是治疗腐败和寻租作为一种集体行动的问题。这些问题经常解决与扩大信任的半径多方举措。

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