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The Central Government, China Banking Regulatory Commission, and Rural Bank:Based on the Analysis of Double Principal-Agent Relationship

机译:中央政府,中国银行业监督管理委员会和农村银行:基于双重委托 - 代理关系的分析

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There is a double principal-agent relationship in the process of construction of rural bank,i.e.,the principal-agent relationship among the central government,China Banking Regulatory Commission and rural bank.The paper begins from the principal-agent relationship of the central government,the China Banking Regulatory Commission,and rural bank.First,using the theory of game and principal-agent,we construct two layers of principal-agent model; second,we analysis how to set up effective governance mechanism through the method of quantity analysis in each layer of the agent relation; finally,we can the conclusions of the paper according to the model results.
机译:农村银行建设过程中存在双重委托 - 代理关系,即中央政府,中国银行业监督管理委员会和农村银行之间的委托 - 代理关系。本文从中央政府的委托 - 代理关系开始,中国银行业监督管理委员会和农村银行。首先,使用游戏理论和委托人,我们构建了两层委托 - 代理模型;其次,我们分析了如何通过代理关系中的每层数量分析来建立有效的治理机制;最后,我们可以根据模型结果结论本文。

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