PUBLIC CHOICE AS A THEORY OF GOVERNMENTAL CORRUPTION: BOTH HELP AND HINDRANCE

摘要

Public choice (PC) theory‘s assumptions of egoistic, self-interested, utilitymaximisation by politicians and bureaucrats has in the past been widely used to explain governmental behaviour in western democracies, and as a theoretical foundation for institutional reform. In a sense, PC assumes that all officials are at least potentially corrupt. Against this background, this paper looks at three main issues. Given that principal-agent approaches dominate in international attempts to combat government corruption, the first section reflects on the status of the knowledge which underpins these attempts. With reference to the idea of a social .tipping point‘, the second section discusses questions as to how and why some countries or jurisdictions which are generally perceived to have low levels of corruption, might over time (and perhaps even quite rapidly) display higher levels of corruption. Finally, the third section raises the possibility that the application of public choice theory to institutional reform in countries which have not displayed high levels of corruption may in fact have the reverse effect of raising at least the potential for increasing corruption.