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GAME ANALYSIS OF GROUP LAWSUIT MECHANISM IN SECURITIES CIVIL ACTIONS

机译:证券民事诉讼中集体诉讼机制的博弈分析

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This paper develops a game model about the group lawsuit mechanism in securities civil actions by utilizing the method of game theory and finds out the Nash equilibrium of the game model. We discuss thoroughly in the last part of this paper and conclude that the group lawsuit is a more effective lawsuit mechanism in securities civil actions than individual lawsuit mechanism and joinder mechanism are in the way that realize the aims of prohibiting the pubic company's inquity and safeguarding the investors' benefit. In order to avoid abusing the group lawsuit mechnism,it is necessary to increase the lawsuit cost; in order to provide adequate incentive for the lawyer to launch the group lawsuit, it is necessary to increase the lawyer's share in lawsuit income.
机译:本文运用博弈论的方法,建立了证券民事诉讼中集体诉讼机制的博弈模型,找出了博弈模型的纳什均衡。在本文的最后部分,我们进行了详尽的讨论,得出的结论是,集体诉讼是证券民事诉讼中比个人诉讼机制更有效的诉讼机制,而联合诉讼机制则可以实现禁止公开发行公司股票并保护其利益的目的。投资者的利益。为了避免滥用群体诉讼机制,有必要增加诉讼成本。为了给律师提起集体诉讼的动机,有必要增加律师在诉讼收益中的比重。

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