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The Stability Analysis of Manufacturer-Stackelberg Process in Two-Echelon Supply-Chain

机译:制造商 - Stackelberg过程在双梯队供应链中的稳定性分析

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In the two-echelon supply-chain literature, the manufacturer-Stackelberg process, i.e. the manufacturer is a Stackelberg leader and the retailer is a Stackelberg follower, is one of the most common gaming assumptions. In which, the optimal prices and optimal profits of the manufacturer and the retailer should be affected by the shape of the demand curve. In this paper, we discuss the influence to the optimal prices and profits by changing the parameters in demand curve, and analyze the stability of the optimal prices and profits of the manufacturer and the retailer. By using the Lipschitz properties of the optimal price-functions and profit-functions on the parameters of the demand curve, we find that there are sizable distinction in the stability of the optimal prices and profits of the manufacturer and the retailer with different demand curves.
机译:在两梯队供应链文献中,制造商 - Stackelberg工艺,即制造商是一个Stackelberg领导者,零售商是Stackelberg追随者,是最常见的游戏假设之一。其中,制造商和零售商的最佳价格和最佳利润应受到需求曲线的形状的影响。在本文中,我们通过改变需求曲线的参数来讨论对最佳价格和利润的影响,并分析制造商和零售商的最佳价格和利润的稳定性。通过使用最佳价格功能的Lipschitz属性和需求曲线参数的利润功能,我们发现在制造商和零售商的最佳价格和利润的稳定性方面存在相当大的区别,并具有不同的需求曲线。

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