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Canal: Scaling Social Network-Based Sybil Tolerance Schemes

机译:运河:基于社交网络的Sybil容差方案

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There has been a flurry of research on leveraging social net-works to defend against multiple identity, or Sybil, attacks. A series of recent works does not try to explicitly identify Sybil identities and, instead, bounds the impact that Sybil identi-ties can have. We call these approaches Sybil tolerance; they have shown to be effective in applications including repu-tation systems, spam protection, online auctions, and con-tent rating systems. All of these approaches use a social net-work as a credit network, rendering multiple identities in-effective to an attacker without a commensurate increase in social links to honest users (which are assumed to be hard to obtain). Unfortunately, a hurdle to practical adoption is that Sybil tolerance relies on computationally expensive network analysis, thereby limiting widespread deployment. To address this problem, we first demonstrate that despite their differences, all proposed Sybil tolerance systems work by conducting payments over credit networks. These pay-ments require max flow computations on a social network graph, and lead to poor scalability. We then present Canal, a system that uses landmark routing-based techniques to ef-ficiently approximate credit payments over large networks. Through an evaluation on real-world data, we show that Canal provides up to a three-order-of-magnitude speedup while maintaining safety and accuracy, even when applied to social networks with millions of nodes and hundreds of millions of edges. Finally, we demonstrate that Canal can be easily plugged into existing Sybil tolerance schemes, en-abling them to be deployed in an online fashion in real-world systems.
机译:关于利用社会净工程抵御多重身份或Sybil,Sybil攻击的研究有一系列的研究。最近的一系列作品并没有试图明确识别Sybil身份,而是界限的影响Sybil Identi-Ties可以拥有的影响。我们称之为Sybil Polatance的方法;它们在包括Repu-Tation Systems,垃圾邮件保护,在线拍卖和Con-Take Rattating系统的应用中,它们已经有效。所有这些方法都使用社会网络工作作为信用网络,呈现对攻击者有效的多个身份,没有相称的社会链接增加对诚实的用户(假设难以获得)。不幸的是,实际采用的障碍是,Sybil容忍依赖于计算昂贵的网络分析,从而限制了广泛的部署。为了解决这个问题,我们首先表明,尽管他们的差异,但所有提出的Sybil容忍系统通过进行信用网络付款。这些付费可以在社交网络图上需要最大流量计算,并导致可扩展性差。然后,我们呈现运河,该系统使用基于地标路由的技术来实现在大型网络上的EF-很近似的信用支付。通过对现实世界数据的评估,我们展示了运河提供了三阶大小的加速,同时保持安全性和准确性,即使应用于数百万节点的社交网络和数亿边缘。最后,我们证明了运河可以很容易地插入现有的Sybil公差方案,以在现实世界系统中以在线方式部署它们。

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