首页> 外文会议>International Conference on E-Business and E-Government >Survey of option game theory of RD investment
【24h】

Survey of option game theory of RD investment

机译:研发投资期权博弈论调查

获取原文

摘要

The paper generally analyzes the development history of option game theory about R&D based on the knowledge of common meaning of enterprise R&D strategy. Like other branch realms of the option game theories, the research of R&D investment option game theory comes from the innovative contributions of Smet (1991), Dixit & Pindyck(1994, 1996), Smit& Ankum(1993), and Smit & Trigeorgis(1997). On the basis of these papers, option game theory of R&D investment can not only handle the uncertainty of R&D or technology adoption, but also the problems of strategic technology adoption taking into account network effects, and the option game equilibrium of multi-stage R&D (or patent) competition. The latest development comes from these papers which consider asymmetric information or cooperative behavior. In sum, the general framework of option game theory on R&D investment is still needed to develop.
机译:本文基于企业研发策略的常见意义的知识,分析了R&D期权博弈论的发展历史。 与选项游戏理论的其他分支领域一样,研发投资期权博弈论的研究来自SMET(1991),Dixit&Pindyck(1994,1996),Smit&Ankum(1993),Smit&Trikeorgis(1997年)的创新贡献 )。 在这些论文的基础上,R&D投资的选项博弈论不能处理研发或技术采用的不确定性,也是考虑网络效应的战略技术采用的问题,以及多阶段研发的期权游戏均衡( 或专利)竞争。 最新的发展来自这些文件,考虑不对称信息或合作行为。 总之,仍然需要开发研发投资的期权博弈论的一般框架。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号