ON THE CORRECT APPLICATION OF ANIMAL SIGNALLING THEORY TO HUMAN COMMUNICATION

摘要

The defining problem of animal signalling theory is how reliable communication systemsremain stable. The problem comes into sharp focus when signals take an arbitrary form,as human words do. Many researchers, including many in evolutionary linguistics,assume that the Handicap Principle is the only recognised solution to this paradox, andhence conclude that the process that underpins reliability in humans must be exceptional.However, this assumption is false: there are many examples of cheap yet reliable signalsin nature, and corresponding evolutionary processes that might explain such exampleshave been identified. This paper briefly reviews the various processes that ay stabilisecommunication and hence suggests a three-way classification: signals may be kept honesteither by (i) being an index, where meaning is tied to form; (ii) handicaps, in which costsare paid by the honest; or (iii) deterrents, in which costs are paid by the dishonest. Ofthese, the latter seems by far the most likely: humans are able to assess individual reputation, and hence hold the threat of social exclusion against those who signal unreliably.