Risk Control, Power Arrangement and Internal Mutual Entrust-agent Model in Small and Medium-sized Enterprises-Management Research in Hunan Small and Medium-sized Enterprises

摘要

The internal finance will lead to the centralized shareholder'equity in the family small and medium-sized enterprises. The members of directorate can make decisions; supervise the directors as well as executive function which form the corporate governance structure consisting of hareholder's meeting, directorate and superintendents'meeting. According to the above model, the directorate will be responsible for the shareholder's meeting as well as for itself. The supervision and incentive will be mutual supervision; control and punishment in the internal organized system. Entrust-agent will be the combination of supervision rights; decision-making rights and operation rights, that is internal mutual entrust-agent management model. Generally speaking, the above model is the natural form in the"organized" system of the market economy, not'self-organized" in the family small and medium-sized enterprises. The article analyzes the efficacy completely in different stages and puts forward some advices on improving the model by means of the small group economic behavior analysis made by Mancur Olson and hierarchical decomposion; information assimilation; information encapsulation made by Aoki Masahiko.