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A Game Theoretic Approach to Decision and Analysis in Strategies of Attack and Defense

机译:攻击战略决策与分析的游戏理论方法

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The interactive behavior between the hacker and the defender is similar to information warfare. The process of attack and defend can be abstracted as a tree diagram and analyzed based on game theory. When a hacker launches an attack, he must do his best to get expected payoff. Similarly the defender may hope to protect system against attacker successfully by minimizing security investment. The tradeoff between attack and defense is hard to keep accurately by means of traditional experience rule. In this paper, we try to solve the problem quickly with the help of game theory. A simple and effective way based on the minimax theorem in game theory is presented. In zerosum games, the minimax solution is the same as the Nash equilibrium. Thus those strategies listed in probability spread can satisfy both involvers. The result accords with the real scenario in common network environment.
机译:黑客与后卫之间的互动行为类似于信息战。攻击和防守过程可以作为树图抽象并根据博弈论分析。当黑客发动攻击时,他必须尽力获得预期的回报。同样,后卫可能希望通过最大限度地减少安全投资来保护系统免受攻击者。攻击与防守之间的权衡难以通过传统体验规则准确保持准确。在本文中,我们试图在游戏理论的帮助下快速解决问题。提出了一种基于博弈论中最低限度定理的简单有效的方法。在零群中,Minimax解决方案与NASH均衡相同。因此,在概率扩展中列出的策略可以满足所有参与者。结果符合公共网络环境中的真实方案。

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