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Effect of Managerial Discretion on CEO Pay-performance Sensitivity

机译:管理自由裁量权对CEO支付性能敏感性的影响

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Both Chinese and foreign scholars have discussed many factors that affect CEO pay-performance sensitivity.However,the persistently low CEO payperformance sensitivity is still not explained effectively.From the perspective of internal governance structure,managerial discretion is introduced as a variable comprehensively reflecting corporate governance quality into traditional Hermalin model and a new theoretical model focusing on the effect of managerial discretion on CEO pay-performance sensitivity is constructed.Based on the model,the paper finds that managerial discretion can affect CEO pay-performance sensitivity negatively to a great deal.
机译:中外学者都讨论了许多影响CEO支付性能敏感性的因素。然而,仍然没有有效地解释的持续低级首席执行官的PayperFormance敏感性。从内部治理结构的角度来看,管理自由裁量权作为全面反映公司治理的可变性质量转化为传统的Hermalin模型和专注于管理层酌情促成CEO支付性能敏感性的新的理论模型。基于该模型,该论文发现管理自行决定可以对大量交易产生负面影响的首席执行官付费性能敏感性。

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