Along with the durative change of global climate, natural disasters are becoming more and more frequent. China is one of the countries which have the most serious natural disasters. Although the government has played an irreplaceable role in the management of natural disaster crises, the pattern of sole government rescues cannot obtain the optimal effect. Corporate social responsibility in natural disasters emergency management has gained much attention from government and researchers. Based on the current definitions domestic and abroad, this paper classifies CSR into compulsory social responsibility and voluntary social responsibility according to our country's current situation, and then use repeated game theory and principal-agent theory to study incentive measures. It is found discount rate determines whether the corporate is willing to take its volunteer social responsibility and its spending for taking responsibility. In addition, enterprises' spending is also influenced by resources guaranteed prices. These results can be helpful for corporate managers to make strategic decision, and also for governments to make regulations in order to encourage corporate to take more social responsibilities in natural disasters emergency management.
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