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Effects of Auctions Trading Mechanisms on Futures Price Behavior——Empirical Evidence from Soybeans Futures Market in Dalian

机译:拍卖交易机制对期货价格行为的影响 - 大连大豆期货市场的实证证据

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Firstly, the paper analyzes the nature of distributions of returns of the open price generated by call auctions and that of returns of the close price by continuous auctions in Dalian Soybeans Futures Market, and empirically finds: (1) that there are significant differences between the distribution of open-to-open returns and that of close-to-close returns, on average, variance and dispersion of the former are greater than those of the latter, its tail fatter, and its kurtosis thinner; (2) that it is more likely that the open price of soybeans futures violates against the efficient market hypothesis than the close price; (3) that an overshooting effect is more likely in the opening than at the close; (4) that the volatility ratio puzzle (or the variance ratio puzzle) exists in Dalian soybeans futures market. Secondly, the above empirical findings are not simply attributed to auctions trading mechanisms, and made a further explanation from auctions trading mechanisms, and information accumulation and diffusion. Then,the paper aims at the cause of the volatility ratio puzzle, and makes a further empirical analysis using high-frequent data, and finds that trading in the opening has more noises of price than the subsequent one, and that a great deal of information accumulating in non-trading period of the previous night does not spread gradually along with trading, and does diffuse rapidly after the opening. This means that the volatility ratio puzzle in Dalian soybeans futures market is not caused by information accumulation and diffusion, but mainly by auctions trading mechanisms, which indicates auctions trading mechanisms do have the effects on soybeans futures price behavior. Therefore, we suggest that the present close call auctions should be reformed into open call auctions, and the time for call auctions should prolong suitably; and that nighttime electronic trading should be developed as soon as possible and non-trading time should be reduced.
机译:首先,分析和通过在大连大豆期货市场连续拍卖,凭经验发现靠近价格的收益由呼叫拍卖产生的开放价的收益分布的性质:(1)存在的间显著差异的分布开即开放返回并且接近到临近返回,平均,方差和前的分散比后者,它的尾巴胖,其峰度较薄的更大; (2),它更可能是大豆期货的开盘价违反对有效市场假说比收盘价; (3),该过冲的效果更可能在开口比在关闭; (4),该波动率难题(或方差比拼图)在大连大豆期货市场存在。其次,上述实证研究结果并不简单地归结为拍卖交易机制,并提出从拍卖交易机制,以及信息的积累和扩散的进一步解释。然后,本文目的是在波动率之谜的原因,使得使用高频繁的数据,并且发现在开盘交易具有价格比随后的一个多噪音进一步实证分析,以及中的大量信息在前一晚的非交易期间累计不与交易逐渐沿扩散,开盘后迅速扩散一样。这意味着,在大连大豆期货市场的波动率之谜是不是由于信息的积累和扩散,但主要是通过拍卖交易机制,这表明拍卖交易机制的确对大豆期货价格行为的影响。因此,我们认为,本千钧一发拍卖应改制为公开征集拍卖,并呼叫拍卖的时间应适当延长;而夜间电子交易应尽快和非交易时间应缩短开发。

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