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Risk-constrained strategic bidding of a hydro producer under price uncertainty

机译:价格不确定性下的水电生产者的风险受到限制的战略招标

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Price uncertainty faced by generation companies in electricity spot markets is a relevant source of risk. The inherent volatility of price series can have a direct influence on short term operational profits, and therefore, there is a natural trend to incorporate risk aversion criteria into the operational decisions. This presentation shows the mathematical formulation of the strategic bidding problem faced by a hydroelectric company, taking into account both price uncertainty and risk aversion constraints. The objective of the model is to find the optimal supply functions to be submitted to the Market Operator. The company is assumed to be price-taker, and therefore, prices are considered exogenous variables. Uncertainty is modeled via scenarios, which are generated by an Input/Output Hidden Markov Model (IOHMM). Risk aversion is introduced by means of coherent risk measures, such as the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) and its generalized version (GCVaR) that can be handled easily in the context of LP and MILP optimization models.
机译:一代公司在电力点市场面临的价格不确定性是有关风险的相关来源。价格系列的固有波动率可以直接影响短期业务利润,因此,存在纳入运营决策的风险厌恶标准存在自然趋势。本演示文稿显示了水力发电公司面临的战略招标问题的数学制定,同时考虑到价格不确定性和风险厌恶约束。该模型的目的是找到提交给市场运营商的最佳供应功能。该公司被认为是价格 - 接受者,因此,价格被认为是外源性变量。不确定性通过方案进行建模,该方案由输入/输出隐马尔可夫模型(IOHMM)生成。通过连贯的风险措施引入风险厌恶,例如条件值 - 风险(CVAR)及其广义版本(GCVAR),可以在LP和MILP优化模型的上下文中轻松处理。

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