Securing Tire Pressure Monitoring System

摘要

Potential security attacks on vehicular networks have been ceaselessly growing. All the known wireless security attacks in addition to vehicle network specific attacks can possibly be experienced. They can target the privacy of the driver and the integrity and confidentiality of messages sent and received within the vehicle and those messages travelling outside the vehicle. One of those possible attacks can be directed at the Tire Pressure Monitoring System (TPMS) sensor. The message broadcasted by the sensor is intended for the TPMS Electronic Control Unit (TPMS ECU). This message cannot be encrypted and authenticated due to the lack of processing capabilities at the sensor side, and therefore, it could be attacked. If the attack is successful, the ID of the sensor, which is unique and transmitted in all broadcasted messages, will be invested to track vehicles, and thus, violating drivers' privacy. Furthermore, the attacker can replace the original message with a malicious one that could possibly adversely impact other Electronic Control Units. This paper attempts to secure the TPMS by suggesting the inclusion of smart sensors to replace the current sensors. Since these smart sensors possess computing power, encryption and authentication will be made possible. The original ID is replaced with an anonymous one, and the whole message including the IDs are encrypted. An unsophisticated encryption approach is used. Both the key and the anonymous ID are replaced with fresh ones after each message is received.