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Beyond Iraq: The new challenges to the nuclear nonproliferation regime

机译:超越伊拉克:核不扩散制度的新挑战

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The future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime is once again questioned. In the mid-nineties, the international community was thinking to be able to fix nuclear non-proliferation for some time. The instruments to prevent nuclear proliferation have been considerably strengthened and some have been added. An additional protocol has been adopted to give the IAEA, the means to detect undeclared activities, nuclear export controls have been reinforced, the NPT has been indefinitely extended, the CTBT has been open to signature and a mandate for a cut-off treaty adopted. But all hopes have vanished. At the dawn of the 21st century, the horizon is blurred. The pace of additional protocol is very slow. Forty-eight NPT countries have no safeguards agreements. Countries outside the NPT will not join it soon. CTBTO will not enter into force in the coming years. The cut-off treaty is still in the limbo at the CD. At the same time, new worrying challenges to the IAEA safeguards and the nuclear non-proliferation regime as a whole have sprang up. North Korea has withdrawn from the NPT and is suspected to produce plutonium and enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. Iran is in violation of its undertakings and is suspected to conceal a nuclear weapon programme, Libya have unveiled and gave up nuclear ambition. An international black market of sensitive technologies from Pakistan has been uncovered. Aside, past negligence and resistance to the AP show up (South Korea, Brazil, and Egypt). Involvement of non state actors and nuclear terrorism is also a new development to deal with. How to tackle these new fearsome challenges? Some answer as PSI, UNSC resolution 1540, G8, have already been given. The answer is probably both political and technical, to allow the organisms in charge to recruit highly specialized experts and implement edge technique and to actually address the issue as the whole and to give the organism in charge the legal means, including addressing the missile proliferation, the reinforcement of the role of the Security Council, the creation of a new inspectorate. This document address technical and political aspects of the question.
机译:核不扩散制度的未来再次质疑。在九十年代中期,国际社会认为能够在一段时间内修复核不扩散。防止核扩散的仪器得到了大大加强,有些已加入。已采用另一份议定书来提供原子能机构,检测未申报活动的手段,核出口管制已加强,但不管已无限期地延长,核对条约已达成签署,并为已通过的截止条约授权。但所有希望都消失了。在21世纪的黎明,地平线模糊。附加方案的步伐非常慢。四十八个国家的国家没有保障措施协议。 NPT外的国家不会很快加入它。 CTBTO在未来几年中不会生效。截止条约仍处于CD的LIMBO中。与此同时,新的令人担忧的挑战对IAEA保障和整个核不扩散制度纷纷蔓延起来。朝鲜已从不扩散核武器条约推出,并怀疑生产钚并为核武器丰富铀。伊朗违反了其企业,并怀疑隐瞒核武器计划,利比亚已经揭幕并放弃了核心野心。来自巴基斯坦的国际黑色市场已被发现。除此之外,过去的疏忽和抵抗AP出现(韩国,巴西和埃及)。非国家行为者和核恐怖主义的参与也是为应对的新发展。如何解决这些新的可怕挑战?一些答案作为PSI,UNSC分辨率1540,G8已经给出。答案可能都是政治和技术,让机会招募高度专业专家并实施边缘技术,并实际上解决了整体问题,并为机构负责法律手段,包括解决导弹扩散,包括解决导弹扩散,包括解决导弹扩散,强化安全理事会的作用,创造了一个新的监察局。本文件涉及问题的技术和政治方面。

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