【24h】

Verifying Dominant Strategy Equilibria in Auctions

机译:验证拍卖中的主导战略均衡

获取原文

摘要

Future agent mediated eCommerce will involve open systems of agents interoperating between different institutions, where different auction protocols may be in use. We argue that in order to achieve this agents will need a method to automatically verify the properties of a previously unseen auction protocol; for example, they may wish to verify that it is fair and robust to deception. We are therefore interested in the problem of automatically verifying the game-theoretic properties of a given auction mechanism, especially the property of strategyproofness. In this paper we show how the Alloy model checker can be used to automatically verify such properties. We illustrate the approach via two examples: a simple two player Vickrey auction and a quantity restricted multi-unit auction using the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism.
机译:未来的代理人介入电子商务将涉及不同机构之间互操作的特工版,不同的拍卖协议可能正在使用。我们认为,为了实现此代理,需要一种方法来自动验证以前看不见的拍卖协议的属性;例如,他们可能希望验证它是公平和欺骗的强大。因此,我们对自动验证给定拍卖机制的游戏理论性质的问题感兴趣,特别是战略防护性的性质。在本文中,我们展示了合金模型检查器如何用于自动验证此类属性。我们通过两个示例说明了方法:使用Vickrey-Clarke-Groves机制,简单的两个玩家Vickrey拍卖和数量限制多单位拍卖。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号