首页> 外文会议>Brazilian Symposium on Artificial Intelligence >A Coalition Formation Mechanism for Trust and Reputation-Aware Multi-Agent Systems
【24h】

A Coalition Formation Mechanism for Trust and Reputation-Aware Multi-Agent Systems

机译:信任和声誉感知多委托系统的联盟形成机制

获取原文
获取外文期刊封面目录资料

摘要

Most multi-agent systems engineering methodologies propose the clear definition of roles and organizations. However, in distributed environments where agents with distinct capabilities coexist and cooperate to solve problems, having a rigid organization structure makes the system less adaptable to changes and failures. Some of the approaches to deal with these difficulties include centralized coordination and planning and the use of homogeneous agent capabilities. These solutions oppose key benefits of multi-agent systems, especially the agents' autonomy to interact and organize freely. In this paper, a novel approach is proposed where agents form and dissolve coalitions in a service-oriented environment while maintaining their autonomy. This allows the agent society to adjust to the demand for services and react to failures. To achieve this flexibility, a coalition formation mechanism for trust and reputation-aware multi-agent systems is employed. As agents interact, they establish a network of trusted peers that allows them to form stable coalitions with reduced risk of failures. Agents can also expand this network by exploring new partnerships based on the reputation of unknown agents that are recommended by these known peers. Experiments were performed to evaluate the proposal, with positive results in environments up to fifty agents under varying service demand and failure rates.
机译:大多数多代理系统工程方法提出了角色和组织的清晰定义。然而,在分布式环境中,具有不同能力的代理共存和合作解决问题,具有刚性组织结构使系统不太适应变化和故障。处理这些困难的一些方法包括集中协调和规划以及使用均质代理能力。这些解决方案反对多代理系统的关键优势,尤其是代理人的自主互动和组织自由。在本文中,提出了一种新的方法,其中代理在维持自主权的同时在面向服务的环境中形成和溶解联盟。这允许代理社会适应对服务的需求并对失败作出反应。为实现这种灵活性,采用了一种信任和声誉感知多代理系统的联盟形成机制。作为代理商互动,他们建立了一个可信同行网络,使他们能够形成稳定的联盟,减少失败的风险。代理商还可以通过根据这些已知同行推荐的未知代理商的声誉来探索新的伙伴关系来扩展该网络。进行实验以评估该提案,阳性结果在不同的服务需求和失败利率下的环境最多。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号