The precautionary principle is frequently invoked by critics who demand tighter political control over the dynamics of technological innovation. The principle seems to imply that uncertainty and lack of knowledge with respect to the risks of new technologies provide sufficient argument against these technologies. Experience from Germany, where the precautionary principle has been enacted in environmental law since the 70s, suggests that this is not the case. The precautionary principle does not effectively supplant the burden of proof: it does not remove the necessity to substantiate risks that warrant the restriction of new technologies nor does it allow such restriction just because we do not need the technology or because we have suitable alternatives. A sense of acute crisis may, however, propel more radical single-issue precautionary policies that disregard the rigorous imperatives of professional law making, such as consistency of rules, international comparison and coordination. This paper will illustrate the meaning and the ambiguity of the precautionary principle as a legal and political rule, taking as the example the policies to regulate the release of genetically engineered organisms into the environment.
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