We present an implementation of a suggested solution to a problem of high relevance to multi-agent systems: that of conflicting information distributed over coop-erating agents. To this end, we use a theory for the treatment of problems arising as a decision making agent faces a situation involving a choice between a finite set of strategies, having access to a finite set of autonomous agents reporting their opinions. Each of these agents may itself play the part of decision making agent, and the theory is independent of whether there is a specific coordinating agent or not. Any decision making agent is allowed to assign different credibilities to the statements made by the other autonomous agents. The theory admits the repre-sentation of vague and numerically imprecise informa-tion, and the evaluation results in a set of admissible strategies by using criteria conforming to classical statistical theory. The admissible strategies can be fur-ther investigated with respect to strength and also with respect to the range of values consistent with the given domain that makes them admissible.
展开▼
