Incentivizing Peer-to-Peer Energy Sharing Using a Core Tâtonnement Algorithm

摘要

Peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading is being considered as an effective approach to manage the distributed energy resources (DER) and provide secure and economical demand-supply balance in the face of variable electric loads and intermittent renewable generations through the local matching of energy demand and supply. However, the existing P2P energy trading mechanisms either neglect the flexibility value of energy storage units (ES) in mitigating demand-supply imbalances or fail to adequately incentivize prosumers to participate in P2P energy trading actively. By using cooperative game theory, this work manages P2P energy trading through constructing an energy grand coalition and an easily implementable core Tâtonnement algorithm is developed to suitably reward prosumers for incentivizing their sustainable participation in the grand coalition. The convergence and stability of the proposed algorithm are theoretically proven while case studies numerically demonstrate its convergence, effectiveness and local demand-supply balancing and RES absorption ability.