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Resource Allocation Optimization in the NFV-Enabled MEC Network Based on Game Theory

机译:基于博弈论的启用NFV的MEC网络中的资源分配优化

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Compared with the conventional mobile edge cloud (MEC) network, the network function virtualization (NFV)-enabled MEC network provides new flexibility on the MEC service deployment. Resource wastage owing to dynamic workloads in traditional MEC networks can be overcome through adaptive resource allocation. In this paper, we investigate the resource allocation problem to minimize the operational cost (e.g., energy consumption, capital expenditure) and the average response time in the NFV-enabled MEC network. We consider the problem from the perspective of MEC service deployment, assignment, and routing among the access points (APs) and MEC servers. We propose an user-network cooperation-based algorithm with low-complexity. In the proposed algorithm, the network announces a path-switching rule (i.e., α-approximate deviation) with proportionally shared operational cost, while the APs selfishly choose their paths with the least cost accordingly. We analyze the selfish behaviors of APs with game theory. We prove existence and convergence of α-approximate equilibriums. Also, we evaluate the efficiency of the equilibriums with the price of stability (POS). Furthermore, an enhanced algorithm based on public service advertising (PSA) is proposed to improve the convergence performance and equilibriums efficiency. Through simulations, we show the superiority of the proposed algorithms over existing algorithms (e.g., BnB-SD and greedy routing) on the accuracy and convergence performance (measured by the overall path switching).
机译:与传统的移动边缘云(MEC)网络相比,支持网络功能虚拟化(NFV)的MEC网络为MEC服务部署提供了新的灵活性。可以通过自适应资源分配来解决由于传统MEC网络中动态工作负载导致的资源浪费。在本文中,我们研究了资源分配问题,以最大程度地降低启用NFV的MEC网络的运营成本(例如,能源消耗,资本支出)和平均响应时间。我们从接入点(AP)和MEC服务器之间的MEC服务部署,分配和路由的角度考虑问题。我们提出了一种基于用户-网络合作的低复杂度算法。在提出的算法中,网络发布一条路径切换规则(即α近似偏差),并按比例分配运营成本,而AP则以最低的成本自私地选择其路径。我们用博弈论分析了AP的自私行为。我们证明了α近似均衡的存在性和收敛性。另外,我们用稳定价格(POS)评估均衡的效率。此外,提出了一种基于公共服务广告(PSA)的增强算法,以提高收敛性能和均衡效率。通过仿真,我们显示了所提出的算法在准确性和收敛性能(通过整体路径切换来衡量)方面优于现有算法(例如BnB-SD和贪婪路由)。

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