The Dark Side of Operational Wi-Fi Calling Services

摘要

All of four major U.S. operators have rolled out nationwide Wi-Fi calling services. They are projected to surpass VoLTE (Voice over LTE) and other VoIP services in terms of mobile IP voice usage minutes in 2018. They enable mobile users to place cellular calls over Wi-Fi networks based on the 3GPP IMS (IP Multimedia Subsystem) technology. Compared with conventional cellular voice solutions, the major difference lies in that their traffic traverses untrustful Wi-Fi networks and the Internet. This exposure to insecure networks may cause the Wi-Fi calling users to suffer from security threats. Its security mechanisms are similar to the VoLTE, because both of them are supported by the IMS. They include SIM-based security, 3GPP AKA (Authentication and Key Agreement), IPSec (Internet Protocol Security), etc. However, are they sufficient to secure Wi–Fi calling services? Unfortunately, our study yields a negative answer. In this work, we explore security issues of the operational Wi-Fi calling services in three major U.S. operators’ networks using commodity devices. We disclose that current Wi-Fi calling security is not bullet-proof. We uncover four vulnerabilities which stem from improper standard designs, device implementation issues and network operation slips. By exploiting them, we devise two proof-of-concept attacks: user privacy leakage and telephony harassment or denial of voice service (THDoS); they can bypass the security defenses deployed on both mobile devices and network infrastructure. We have confirmed their feasibility and simplicity using real-world experiments, as well as assessed their potential damages and proposed recommended solutions.