High-Level Synthesis with Timing-Sensitive Information Flow Enforcement

摘要

Specialized hardware accelerators are being increasingly integrated into today's computer systems to achieve improved performance and energy efficiency. However, the resulting variety and complexity make it challenging to ensure the security of these accelerators. To mitigate complexity while guaranteeing security, we propose a high-level synthesis (HLS) infrastructure that incorporates static information flow analysis to enforce security policies on HLS-generated hardware accelerators. Our security-constrained HLS infrastructure is able to effectively identify both explicit and implicit information leakage. By detecting the security vulnerabilities at the behavioral level, our tool allows designers to address these vulnerabilities at an early stage of the design flow. We further propose a novel synthesis technique in HLS to eliminate timing channels in the generated accelerator. Our approach is able to remove timing channels in a verifiable manner while incurring lower performance overhead for high-security tasks on the accelerator.