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On-chip Data Security Against Untrustworthy Software and Hardware IPs in Embedded Systems

机译:针对嵌入式系统中不可信赖的软件和硬件IP的片上数据安全性

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State-of-the-art system-on-chip (SoC) field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) integrate hard powerful ARM processor cores and the reconfigurable logic fabric on a single chip in addition to many commonly needed high performance and high-bandwidth peripherals. The increasing reliance on untrustworthy third-party IP (3PIP) cores, including both hardware and software in FPGA-based embedded systems has made the latter increasingly vulnerable to security attacks. Detection of trojans in 3PIPs is extremely difficult to current static detection methods since there is no golden reference model for 3PIPs. Moreover, many FPGA-based embedded systems do not have the support of security services typically found in operating systems. In this paper, we present our run-time, low-cost, and low-latency hardware and software based solution for protecting data stored in on-chip memory blocks, which has attracted little research attention. The implemented memory protection design consists of a hierarchical top-down structure and controls memory access from software IPs running on the processor and hardware IPs running in the FPGA, based on a set of rules or access rights configurable at run time. Additionally, virtual addressing and encryption of data for each memory help protect confidentiality of data in case of a failure of the memory protection unit, making it hard for the attacker to gain access to the data stored in the memory. The design is implemented and tested on the Intel (Altera) DE1-SoC board featuring a SoC FPGA that integrates a dual-core ARM processor with reconfigurable logic and hundreds of memory blocks. The experimental results and case studies show that the protection model is successful in eliminating malicious IPs from the system without need for reconfiguration of the FPGA. It prevents unauthorized accesses from untrusted IPs, while arbitrating access from trusted IPs generating legal memory requests, without incurring a serious area or latency penalty.
机译:最先进的片上系统(SoC)现场可编程门阵列(FPGA)除了许多通常需要的高性能和高带宽外设之外,还在单个芯片上集成了功能强大的ARM处理器内核和可重新配置的逻辑结构。 。对不可信赖的第三方IP(3PIP)内核(包括基于FPGA的嵌入式系统中的硬件和软件)的依赖性越来越高,这使得后者越来越容易受到安全攻击。当前的静态检测方法很难检测3PIP中的木马,因为没有3PIP的黄金参考模型。此外,许多基于FPGA的嵌入式系统没有操作系统中通常提供的安全服务的支持。在本文中,我们提出了一种基于运行时,低成本和低延迟的硬件和软件的解决方案,用于保护存储在片上存储模块中的数据,这引起了很少的研究关注。已实现的存储器保护设计由分层的自上而下的结构组成,并基于可在运行时配置的一组规则或访问权限来控制处理器上运行的软件IP和FPGA中运行的硬件IP的存储器访问。此外,在存储器保护单元发生故障的情况下,对每个存储器进行虚拟寻址和数据加密有助于保护数据的机密性,从而使攻击者难以访问存储在存储器中的数据。该设计在英特尔(Altera)DE1-SoC板上进行了实现和测试,该板上具有SoC FPGA,该FPGA集成了具有可重配置逻辑和数百个存储块的双核ARM处理器。实验结果和案例研究表明,该保护模型可以成功地从系统中消除恶意IP,而无需重新配置FPGA。它可以防止来自不受信任IP的未经授权的访问,同时仲裁来自产生合法内存请求的受信任IP的访问,而不会造成严重的面积或延迟损失。

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