You Cannot Sense My PINs: A Side-Channel Attack Deterrent Solution Based on Haptic Feedback on Touch-Enabled Devices

摘要

In this paper, we introduce a novel and secure solution to mitigate side-channel attacks to capture the PINs like touchID and other credentials of touch-enabled devices. Our approach can protect haptic feedback enabled devices from potential direct observation techniques such as cameras and motion sense techniques including such as accelerometers in smart-watch. Both attacks use the concept of shoulder surfing in social engineering and were published recently (CCS'14 and CCS'15). Hand-held devices universally employ small vibration motors as an inexpensive way to provide haptic feedback. The strength of the haptic feedback depends on the brand and the device manufacturer. They are usually strong enough to produce sliding movement and make audible noises if the device is resting on the top of a desk when the vibration motor turns. However, when the device is held in the hand the vibration can only be sensed by the holder; it is usually impossible or uncertain for an observer to know when the vibration motor turns. Our proposed solution uses the haptic feedback to inform the internal state of the keypad to the user and takes advantage of the fact that the effect of haptic feedback can be easily cloaked in such a way that direct observation techniques and indirect sensing techniques will fail. We develop an application on Android cell phones to demonstrate it and invite users to test the code. Moreover, we use real smart-watch to sense the vibration of Android cell phones. Our experimental results show that our approach can mitigate the probability of sensing a 4-digit or 6-digit PINs using smart-watch to below practical value. Our approach also can mitigate the probability of recognizing a 4-digit or 6-digit PINs using a camera within 1 meter to below practical value because the user does not need to move his or her hand during the internal states to input different PINs.