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Game-Theoretic Modeling and Control of Military Air Operations with Retaliatory Civilians

机译:与报复性平民的游戏理论建模与军用空气运营控制

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摘要

Non-neutral civilians often play an active role in wars. That is, they are not just passively static but might dynamically take non-neutral actions to retaliate against the Forces who create collateral damage for them. Unfortunately, existing game theoretic models usually do not consider this situation. In this paper, an attrition-type discrete time dynamic game model is formulated, in which two opposing forces fight under reactive civilian environments that might be either neutral or slightly biased. We model the objective functions, control strategies of different players, and identify the associated constraints on the control and state variables. Existing attrition-like state space models can be regarded as a special case of the model proposed in this paper. An example scenario and extensive simulations illustrate possible applications of this model and comparative discussions further clarify the benefits.
机译:非中性平民经常在战争中发挥积极作用。也就是说,它们不仅仅是被动静态,而且可能动态采取非中立行动来报复对它们产生抵押伤害的力量。不幸的是,现有的游戏理论模型通常不考虑这种情况。本文制定了一种潮湿型离散时间动态游戏模型,其中两个相对的力量在可能是中性的或略微偏见的反应性民用环境下进行抗击。我们模拟了目标函数,控制不同玩家的策略,并识别控制和状态变量的相关约束。现有的磨损样状态空间模型可以被认为是本文提出的模型的特殊情况。示例场景和广泛的模拟说明了该模型的可能应用,并且比较讨论进一步阐明了益处。

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