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'How Safe Is Safe Enough?': A PRA Perspective on GSI-191

机译:“足够安全有多安全?':在GSI-191上的PRA透视

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Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) can be used to provide insights to the question of "How Safe is Safe Enough?" The three key traditional keystones of safety are compliance with regulatory requirements; ensuring that defense in depth for accident prevention and mitigation; and maintaining safety margins. The methods used to show compliance with regulatory requirements can significantly impact the design and operation of the plant, especially the conservatisms included in the analysis methods to address uncertainties in knowledge. The PRA can be used to show that, at some point the degree of conservatisms in the analysis methods does not increase safety as measured by the core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF) risk metrics. A series of PRA analyses have been performed to show the sensitivity of the risk metrics to various key assumptions used to drive the design and operational features of long term core cooling using containment sump recirculation. This directly ties to the NRC acceptance of plant modifications to respond to Generic Issue 191 to ensure long term core cooling via sump recirculation. These sensitivity analyses show that wholesale insulation change-out and further containment sump re-design may not improve safety as measured by risk. Additional focus on other aspects of accident prevention and mitigation such as leak detection and containment water management strategies provide additional defense in depth and decrease overall risk metrics. Thus, the fundamental keystones of safety may not be optimized by only considering conservatisms in methods used for regulatory compliance. This paper describes the analyses and results along with recommendations for improving the probability of successful long term core cooling via sump recirculation and the NRC acceptance of the current plant modifications to address GSI-191.
机译:概率风险评估(PRA)可用于为“安全足够安全有多安全的问题提供见解安全的三个关键传统科克斯符合法规要求;确保防守的防守,以便预防和缓解;并保持安全利润率。用于表现出遵守法规要求的方法可以显着影响工厂的设计和运营,尤其是在分析方法中包含的保守主义,以解决知识中的不确定性。 PRA可用于表明,在某些时候,分析方法中的保守程度不会增加通过核心损伤频率(CDF)和大型早期释放频率(LERF)风险指标的安全性。已经进行了一系列PRA分析,以显示风险指标对各种关键假设的敏感性,用于使用容纳贮槽再循环驱动长期芯冷却的设计和操作特征的各种关键假设。这直接与NRC接受植物修改的联系,以响应通用问题191,以确保通过油底壳再循环的长期核心冷却。这些敏感性分析表明,批发绝缘改变和进一步的遏制贮槽重新设计可能不会改善风险衡量的安全性。额外关注事故预防和缓解的其他方面,如泄漏检测和遏制水管理策略,深入提供额外的防御并降低整体风险指标。因此,仅通过考虑用于监管依从性的方法的保守主义,可能无法优化安全的基本结构。本文介绍了分析和结果以及提高通过油底壳再循环的成功长期核心冷却概率和NRC接受当前植物修改来解决GSI-191的建议。

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