Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Quality of Elderly-care Services Based on Public-private Partnership Supply Pattern

摘要

Public-Private Partnership supply pattern have been widely employed to alleviate contradictions between supply and demand in elderly-care industry in China. Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper analyses the effects of supervision of government, service cost, consumers’ initial state, consumers’ cost and sense of acquisition of service on decision process for government, private investors and consumers in the three-dimension system. With simulation methodology applied, some results have been obtained: only the active supervision and small difference between costs of high-quality services and low- quality services can make private investors abandon the attempt of developing low-quality services at the early stage of strategy evolution. Furthermore, although choices of consumers often lags behind the market, government’s regulation of the elderly-care market can drive consumers to change their ideas and choose institutional care. Finally, we find that when consumers pay a certain cost, the higher the benefits (including happiness, pleasure degree, etc.) they get, the slower the evolution rate of the strategy towards institutional care.