Evolutionary Analysis of Vaccination Strategies for Infectious Diseases Considering Neutral Strategy

摘要

In this paper, we propose an evolutionary game model of epidemic vaccination strategies considering neutral strategy on the homogeneous network. By establishing a state layer and a strategy layer for each individual in the network, we conduct an evolutionary game analysis of epidemic vaccination strategies. Firstly, we take into account various factors such as vaccination effectiveness, government subsidy rate, treatment discount rate, vaccination cost and treatment cost based on the traditional SIR model. We fully analyze various risk factors affecting vaccination. In the strategy layer, we introduce a new neutral strategy. Then, we analyze the proportion of individuals and game benefit of each strategy and use the mean field theory to establish a dynamic equation based on the proposed model. Simulation results show that in order to increase the number of individuals vaccinated when the network evolution is stable, the vaccination effectiveness should be increased and vaccination cost should be reduced. For government decision making, choosing the appropriate vaccination cost determines whether the network evolves towards vaccination strategy.