Analysis of the mechanism of the examinee's shortage of credibility and integrity under the information economy theory — Taking the on-line regulating matriculation for graduate student for example

摘要

The examinee's shortage of credibility and integrity has hindered the steady and rapid development of the on-line regulating matriculation for graduate student. Many researchers and recruiting departments focus on system setup to strengthen the restraint of the examinee's dishonest behaviour. Being different from it, this paper attempts to research rational system design based on analyzing the causes of information asymmetry existing in the principal-agent relationship between the recruiting departments and examinees from the perspective of information economy theory. The solutions to lower the on-line regulating matriculation cost and reduce the rate of the examinee's shortage of credibility and integrity proposed by the authors are as follows: intensifying the information transparency and timeliness of the recruiting departments, adjusting the schedule of the non-regulating matriculation recruiting departments and the regulating matriculation ones and setting up examinee's credit records.